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THE LIMITS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY: A COURSE INTO THE
DARK?
The Example: Commonwealth v. Smith
ANNE BOWEN POULIN*
Q CCASIONALLY, the government's behavior in a criminal pros-
ecution so impinges on the defendant's rights, or so offends
notions of fairness, that a court will feel impelled to a drastic rem-
edy. Commonwealth v. Smith' is such a case. In a case that attracted
widespread media attention,2 Jay Smith, a high school principal,
was prosecuted for the murder of a teacher at his school and her
two children. 3 The defendant's case was tried to a jury. Based on
the circumstantial evidence connecting him with the murders,
Smith was convicted and sentenced to death.4 During the trial, no
conduct or error occurred that would have provoked a mistrial re-
quest. Additionally, the prosecutorial behavior did not create the
appearance of extreme unfairness or overreaching. The evidence
adduced at trial, although circumstantial, was sufficient to support
the verdict of guilty. 5 On direct appeal, Smith challenged his con-
viction on several grounds. The court reversed and remanded for a
new trial because the trial court had improperly admitted a number
of unreliable hearsay statements. 6
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. I would like to thank
my research assistants, Michael Milone, Melissa Palat and Megan Pomeroy
Whitcopf for their work in the preparation of this manuscript. I am also grateful
to Dean Frankino and Villanova Law School for generously supporting my efforts.
1. 615 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1992).
2. In addition to ordinary press coverage, the case was the subject of two
books and a television mini-series. LORETrA SCHWARTz-NOBEL, ENGAGED TO MUR-
DER: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE MAIN LINE MURDERS (1987); JOSEPH WAMBAUGH,
ECHOES IN THE DARKNESS (1987) (made into a 1987 CBS mini-series of the same
name).
3. See Smith, 615 A.2d at 322 Susan Reinert and her two children were mur-
dered in June, 1979. The theory of the prosecution was that Smith and William
Bradfield, a fellow teacher who was Reinert's fiance and the beneficiary of her life
insurance policy, formed a conspiracy to kill Reinert in order to collect the pro-
ceeds of her life insurance policies. See id.
4. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 568 A.2d 600, 602 (Pa. 1989). This circum-
stantial evidence included, among other things, hair similar to Susan Reinert's
found at Smith's home, a green pin similar to one worn by Karen Reinert found
under the seat of Smith's car, certain fibers found on Susan Reinert's body and a
comb found under Susan Reinert's dead body allegedly belonging to Smith. Id. at
604-05.
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Only later, Smith discovered that he had been the victim of
serious misconduct by the prosecution. Well after the trial con-
cluded, Smith discovered that the prosecution had withheld excul-
patory evidence and had concealed an existing agreement with a
key prosecution witness. 7 The course of conduct through which
the prosecution suppressed this favorable information was, in the
court's view, "egregious."" First, the prosecution had not disclosed
its agreement with a prosecution witness, thereby permitting the
witness' false testimony to stand uncorrected and precluding effec-
tive impeachment.9 Second, the defense sought, but did not re-
ceive, evidence that sand was found between the victim's toes to
support the defense theory that the murder was committed in Cape
May, NewJersey.10 At trial, a former state trooper who had investi-
gated the crime was called by the prosecution and testified on cross
examination that he had used lifters to remove particles that looked
like sand from between the victim's toes." The prosecution "exco-
riated" the witness and called other officers to establish that the
testimony about the lifters was false.1 2 Then, while the "trial was still
in progress," the state police found the missing lifters.' 3 The two vio-
lations at trial were compounded by the Commonwealth's post-trial
conduct. The Commonwealth continued to conceal the existence
of the lifters while arguing on appeal "that [the] court should af-
firm [Smith's] death sentence."' 4 The Commonwealth finally re-
vealed the existence of the lifters more than two years after the
trial. 15 In light of these facts, the court concluded that the first trial
had been more unfair than initially recognized and that the course
of misconduct was so extreme that a new trial would unfairly op-
press Smith. The court therefore barred further proceedings in the
7. Id. at 322-23.
8. Id. at 323.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 322. The sand was important because the scene of Reinert's murder
was unresolved. William Bradfield, who was convicted of three counts of first de-
gree murder for the death of Susan Reinert and her children, was in Cape May at
the time of the actual killing. In his defense, Smith asserted that Bradfield com-
mitted the murder in Cape May and Smith was not involved in the conspiracy. See
id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The prosecution recommended that the trooper be investigated for
perjury. The prosecution also argued that the defense had paid the trooper to
fabricate his story about the lifters. Id. at 323-24.
13. Id. at 323 (emphasis in original).
14. Id. at 324.
15. Id. at 323-24. The court observed that "even then, there seemed to be
some hesitancy concerning the prosecutor's duty to disclose the evidence." Id. at
324.
[Vol. 39: p. 627
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case and discharged Smith.' 6
With its decision in Smith, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
shocked many who had followed the case.' 7 The court freed a no-
torious defendant who had been convicted of murder. The court's
decision to discharge the defendant, who had been convicted by a
jury on sufficient evidence, is a startling departure from the usual
remedy of granting a new trial.' 8 Through its decision, the court
foreclosed any opportunity for the Commonwealth to correct its er-
rors and seek a new conviction in a trial untainted by error. The
case therefore raises compelling questions. Are there cases in
which prosecutorial misconduct, discovered after a verdict, is so ex-
treme that it warrants discharging the defendant? If 'so, what'is the
legal basis for this extreme remedy? Finally, how can courts identify
the misconduct that requires this extreme response?
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts frequently must determine the consequences of govern-
ment misconduct. The nature of the misconduct and the point in
the proceedings at which it is discovered affect the 'court's ability to
remedy the problem in a way that protects the defendant without
disserving the public's interest in the pursuit of justice. A claim of
misconduct that is raised before a verdict is rendered can often be
remedied without disrupting the trial.' 9 Those that cannot be han-
dled so easily may require the trial court to declare a mistrial, a
result that only rarely bars retrial. 20 Smith, however, represents the
most difficult type of case. The government misconduct was not
apparent during the trial. Indeed, it was discovered only after both
the verdict and the initial appeal.2 1 Moreover, unlike some types of
16. Id. at 325.
17. Rich Henson, Smith Case is Seen as a Warning, to Prosecutors, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER, Sept. 20, 1992, at BI; Emilie Lounsberry & Mark Faziollah, Pa. High Court
Frees Jay Smith, PHnAi INQUIRER, Sept. 19, 1992, at Al.
18. For a discussion of the more common remedy of retrial, see infra note 27
and accompanying text.
19. For example, a court can give curative instructions, strike testimony or
grant a continuance to deal with misconduct during the trial. See, e.g., Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (relying in part on curative instructions to sup-
port conclusion that prosecutor's improper argument did not deprive defendant
of fair trial). See generally BENNETT GERSHAM, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, §§ 13.1
et seq. (discussing efficacy of curative instructions, contempt orders, fines, repri-
mands, removal and disqualification).
20. For a discussion of when a mistrial bars retrial, see infra notes 33-35 and
accompanying text.
21. Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 322 (Pa. 1992).
1994]
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misconduct, it affected the fairness of the trial.22
Still, it does not follow that the defendant is automatically enti-
tled to the extreme remedy of discharge. In most instances, a de-
fendant whose trial was unfair simply receives a new trial. In some
cases, however, the misconduct may be so extreme or so prejudicial
to the defendant that the government should be foreclosed from
further prosecution. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court placed the
Smith case in the latter category and, without raising any question of
Smith's guilt, discharged him on the grounds that reprosecution
would violate the Pennsylvania Constitution's protection against
double jeopardy.2 3 In the truest sense, the defendant went free be-
cause the constable blundered. This Article examines Smith and
considers how to determine when a case falls in that small category
of cases in which double jeopardy protection bars further prosecu-
tion because of government misconduct in the first trial.
A case like Smith raises questions concerning both the legal ba-
sis and the standard for barring further proceedings as a result of
misconduct discovered after conviction. Of the possible bases for
discharging a defendant because of such prosecutorial misbehavior,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court chose double jeopardy.2 4 This Ar-
ticle will examine whether double jeopardy principles are appropri-
ately invoked to justify discharging a defendant like Smith and
whether double jeopardy lends itself to meaningful standards for
determining when discharge is appropriate.
Double jeopardy is only one possible basis for a decision like
that in Smith. Two other possible bases-due process and the su-
pervisory power of the court-are beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, before considering the double jeopardy implications
of the case more fully, we should consider briefly why the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court may have seen double jeopardy as the most
attractive basis on which to rest the decision in Smith. To determine
the legal framework within which to evaluate cases like Smith, we
need to identify the interests and concerns that impel the courts to
grant the defendant the drastic remedy of discharge.
As a general proposition, courts are reluctant to grant the ex-
22. Some types of misconduct, such as ethical infractions or violation of grand
jury rules, may not affect the fairness of the trial. See, e.g., GERSHAM, supra note 19,
at §§ 2.1 et seq. (stating most grand jury misconduct affects investigation of case or
indictment but does not affect trial).
23. Smith, 615 A.2d at 325. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Pennsylvania
Constitution bars retrial when the conduct of the prosecutor is intended to preju-
dice the defendant and deny the right to a fair trial. Id.
24. Id.
[Vol. 39: p. 627
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treme remedy of discharge. Occasionally, a court is driven by a con-
cern for governmental impropriety, regardless of its demonstrated
impact on the defendant. In rare cases, courts have invoked the
Due Process Clause and granted the dismissal of the charges against
a defendant simply to deter or punish governmental misconduct.2 5
25. Some decisions seem to suggest that unrestrained government miscon-
duct during the investigation and prosecution of a defendant may violate a defend-
ant's right to due process of law, regardless of its effect upon the defendant's
substantive rights. That is, tactics employed by the government may be so outra-
geous that they violate notions of fundamental fairness, entitling the defendant to
a remedy on due process grounds even in the absence of demonstrated prejudice.
See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973) (noting that in situa-
tions where conduct of law enforcement agents is extremely outrageous, "due pro-
cess principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial
processes to obtain a conviction"); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959)
(reversing conviction due to government use of involuntary confession); United
States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978) (dismissing charges against defendants
because government conduct during undercover investigation violated "funda-
mental fairness"); Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971) (dis-
missing charges against defendant due to outrageous government conduct).
However, the support for this argument is limited. More often, the courts have
granted relief only when the defendant demonstrated prejudice flowing from the
government's misbehavior. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250,
263 (1988) (reversing district court's dismissal of indictment, due to prosecutorial
misconduct, because there was no finding of prejudice); United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 684 (1985) (holding that government misconduct is only grounds
for relief if there is reasonable probability it affected outcome of trial).
An appealing argument can be made that the defendant should receive a rem-
edy for some types of violations without demonstrating prejudice. For example, if
the prosecution, acting in bad faith, fails to disclose exculpatory evidence, the mis-
conduct can have a profound impact on the fairness of a trial. Moreover, unlike
trial misconduct, which takes place in view of the court, such covert violations may
never be discovered. Therefore, when a violation comes to light, the court's re-
sponse should be strong enough to discourage other prosecutors from risking sim-
ilar sanctions, even discounted for the likelihood that the violation will go
undetected. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REv. 693 (1987) (noting that current system
offers no real deterrent to prosecutorial non-disclosure and recommending over-
haul of punishments for such violations, including bar disciplinary bodies review-
ing opinions for possible misconduct, more severe sanctions and reversal of
convictions where prosecutor intentionally suppressed exculpatory evidence); Wal-
ter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 Sw. L.J. 965
(1984) (calling for appellate courts, or proposed grievance board, to impose strict
sanctions on unethical prosecutors and not merely reverse convictions, because
reversal neither punishes prosecutor nor deters future violations).
A defendant who complains of lost or destroyed evidence will sometimes win
the drastic remedy of dismissal of the charges. If important exculpatory evidence
is permanently unavailable to the defendant, then a fair trial is foreclosed and no
other remedy will redress the unfairness. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51,
69 (1988) (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (arguing that Court should look to numerous
factors such as type of evidence, possibility that such evidence would have been
exculpatory and existence of other similar evidence, "[rather than allow a State's
ineptitude to saddle a defendant with an impossible burden"). To determine
whether loss or destruction of evidence violates the defendant's right to due pro-
cess of law, the Court focuses on more than just the behavior of the law enforce-
19941
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Never popular, this approach is certainly not in favor with modem
courts.2 6 More often, therefore, the defendant must point to a de-
fense interest requiring vindication through the extreme remedy of
dismissal. The defendant's interest in receiving a fair trial will not
suffice to justify discharge. That interest justifies only a retrial, in
which the prosecution may obtain a valid conviction.27 Thus, only
an interest of an unusual nature will support the outright discharge
of a defendant on grounds of previously undiscovered prosecutorial
misconduct.
The Double Jeopardy Clause is intended to protect such unu-
sual interests. It does not shield the defendant's right to a fair trial.
Moreover, the only relief appropriate to protect the defendant's
Double Jeopardy interest is to bar further prosecution.28 Thus,
double jeopardy may bar further prosecution even if the first trial
was fair. For that reason double jeopardy may have seemed an in-,
viting basis for the decision in Smith. Moreover, as this Article con-
cludes, a case like Smith implicates the defendant's Double Jeopardy
interests to an extent that warrants double jeopardy protection.
ment officials during the investigation. In Youngblood, the Court held that "unless
a defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve poten-
tially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law." Young-
blood, 488.U.S. at 57. Thus, relief depends on the bad faith of the government
rather than merely the nature of the government conduct or its impact on the
fairness of the defendant's trial.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (re-
jecting argument that trial of defendant who was forcibly abducted from Mexico
would violate due process); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (holding that
due process did not require exclusion of statements taken from suspect who was
not informed by police that his sister had already obtained counsel for him);
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 733 (1980) (holding that evidence could be
admitted against defendant, even though it was seized from third party by "uncon-
stitutional and possibly criminal behavior").
27. Even a retrial is not always granted. Courts are reluctant to reverse convic-
tions and grant new trials. Indeed, the courts often rely on the doctrine of harm-
less error to affirm convictions when the trial was procedurally unfair but the
verdict is strongly supported by the evidence. See generally Steven H. Goldberg,
Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief 71 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 428
(1980) (stating that following line of confusing Supreme Court decisions, "an ap-
pellate court faced with an error of constitutional dimension should make its own
independent evaluation of the evidence, and reverse the conviction only if it was
persuaded that the average jury would have changed its verdict"); Tom Stacey &
Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 79, 80
(1988) (noting that Supreme Court has adopted view that "constitutional error
generally does not necessitate automatic reversal of a criminal conviction: error is
harmless and the conviction must be upheld when an appellate court concludes
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had no impact on the ultimate finding of
guilt").
28. For a discussion of appropriate double jeopardy relief, see infra notes 34-
35 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 39: p. 627632
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II. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY INTERESTS
Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court based its decision in
Smith on the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion,29 the decision raises questions concerning whether double
jeopardy jurisprudence provides a solid legal basis and helpful stan-
dards to determine when prosecutorial misconduct requires the
court to discharge a defendant rather than order a new trial. It is
not clear whether the Pennsylvania court has steered out of the
mainstream and is now navigating uncharted double jeopardy wa-
ters or whether the court has merely followed the charted course of
double jeopardy law to a new but inevitable conclusion. Although
the United States Supreme Court appears to have narrowed the
protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United
States Constitution,3 0 the issue is not settled. The Court has not
addressed the precise question raised by Smith and has, in other
decisions, demonstrated a tendency to change course in its effort to
interpret the Double Jeopardy Clause.31 In addition, although
many states follow the rules decided by the United States Supreme
Court,3 2 states are free to interpret their own constitutions to pro-
vide greater double jeopardy protection than the United States
Constitution.33 Therefore, the issue warrants scrutiny.
Double jeopardy protects the defendant's interest in freedom
29. PA. CONST. art. I, § 10. The section reads in pertinent part: "No person
shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ......
30. For a discussion of the United States Supreme Court's narrow interpreta-
tion of the Double Jeopardy Clause, see infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
31. The Court's difficulty in defining the scope of double jeopardy protection
is reflected in two instances in which the Court overruled decisions within a few
years of each other. The Court was struggling with the reasons for and corre-
sponding application of double jeopardy. See United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct.
2849, 2851 (1993) (stating that "same conduct rule" announced three years prior
is "wholly inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court precedent and with clear com-
mon-law understanding of double jeopardy"), overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S.
508 (1990); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87 (1978) (holding that United
States v. Jenkins "placed an unwarrantedly great emphasis on the defendant's right
to have his guilt decided by the first jury empaneled to try him"), overruling United
States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
32. See, e.g., State v. Mallett, 604 A.2d 1263 (R.I. 1992) (holding that Double
Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial when mistrial is granted at defendant's re-
quest). See generally BARRY LATZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(1991).
33. See, e.g., Pool v. Superior Court, 677 P.2d 261, 270 (Ariz. 1984) (barring
retrial when prosecutor "intentionally engaged in improper conduct for the pur-
pose of forcing defendant to seek a mistrial so that the prosecution could procure
a new indictment with correct charges"); State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316 (Or.
1983) (holding that retrial is barred when prosecutor knowingly acts in manner so
improper that mistrial must be declared). See generally State v. Cochran, 751 P.2d
1194 (Wash. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 110 Wash. 2d 1017 (1988) (discussing criteria
7
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from multiple trials and multiple punishments, rather than the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial.34 Unlike protections addressed to the
defendant's interest in a fair trial, double jeopardy protection
sometimes bars retrial of a defendant even though the defendant
could receive a fair trial and there is no demonstrated deficiency in
the prosecution's evidence.35 It may be that double jeopardy inter-
ests, as in Smith, require the courts to bar retrial and discharge a
defendant who was convicted on sufficient evidence in the first
trial.
Such a case, however, poses extremely difficult double jeop-
ardy questions. Double jeopardy jurisprudence, as developed by
the United States Supreme Court and followed in many states, does
not readily accommodate the argument of a defendant in Smith's
position. 36 The Court has articulated rules and analytical ap-
proaches for specific types of cases, but none of those rules provides
a double jeopardy bar to retrial after a defendant is convicted on
sufficient evidence in a single complete trial. To assess the double
jeopardy implications of Smith's situation, we must identify the rele-
vant rules, articulate the reasons for those rules, and scrutinize their
relevance to the situation posited.
The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the government from
forcing the defendant through successive proceedings. Successive
prosecutions may result when the government seeks another oppor-
tunity to try the defendant on the same charges.37 An acquittal ab-
solutely eliminates this possibility.38 Therefore, the government
by which to determine whether state constitution should be interpreted in accord
with federal constitution).
34. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) (noting that
"'double jeopardy' was designed to protect an individual from being subjected to
the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once").
35. See, e.g., United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (plurality opinion)
(barring retrial when lower court judge dismissed jury in absence of manifest ne-
cessity); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963) (barring retrial when lower
court judge discharged first jury, over petitioner's objection, because key prosecu-
tion witness was not present).
36. For a general discussion of the principles guiding application of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, see infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
37. Another way to achieve successive prosecutions is to bring additional
charges arising out of the same criminal episode. If the additional charges are
closely enough related to those first prosecuted, double jeopardy bars the later
proceedings. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) (prohibiting prosecution for
theft of automobile after defendant had already pled guilty to operating same au-
tomobile without owner's consent); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
299 (1932) (defining "same offense" test for when Double Jeopardy will bar fur-
ther proceedings).
38. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978)1 (holding that second trial
should not be permitted after acquittal, even if acquittal was mistaken); Sanabria v.
634 [Vol. 39: p. 627
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may manipulate the first trial to avoid a probable verdict of acquit-
tal and keep open the option of retrying the defendant. A mistrial
may achieve this result for the prosecution. To obtain a mistrial,
the prosecution can either persuade the trial court to declare a mis-
trial sua sponte or on the government's motion, or the prosecution
can successfully goad the defendant to stop the trial. The double
jeopardy rules define the tests to be applied in those situations.39
Smith involves a different means of avoiding possible acquittal-cov-
ert manipulation of the evidence.
Certain clearly established double jeopardy principles restrict
the government's freedom to pursue successive prosecutions in
these ways and bear on the issues raised by Smith. First, a verdict
not overturned on appeal is final and bars further prosecution for
the same offense.4° Second, reversal of a conviction does not bar
retrial unless the reversal rests on the insufficiency of the evidence
presented at trial.41 Third, a proceeding that becomes so tainted
that it leads to a mistrial will raise a double jeopardy bar to further
proceedings in only two circumstances. If the mistrial was granted
without the defendant's consent, it will bar retrial unless it was dic-
tated by manifest necessity.42 If the mistrial was granted with the
defendant's consent, it will bar retrial if it was prompted by
prosecutorial misconduct intended to goad the defendant to seek a
United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978) (holding acquittal, though erroneous, is "final
and unreviewable"); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (holding ac-
quittal is final even though judge improperly directed acquittal); United States v.
Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) (holding that when jury returns verdict of not guilty,
further prosecution is barred).
39. For a discussion of when mistrial may bar retrial under double jeopardy
rules, see infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
40. See Ball, 163 U.S. at 670 ("If the judgment is upon an acquittal, the de-
fendant, indeed, will not seek to have it reversed; and the government cannot.").
41. See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988) (holding that, although double
jeopardy bars retrial when appellate court sets aside conviction based on insuffi-
ciency of evidence at trial, retrial is permitted if prosecution introduced sufficient
evidence at first trial even though essential evidence was improperly admitted);
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 32 (1982) (holding that "a reversal based on the
weight, rather than the sufficiency, of the evidence permits the State to initiate a
new prosecution"); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (holding that "the
Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has
found the evidence legally insufficient"); Commonwealth v. Green, 536 A.2d 436,
438 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) ("Because appellant was granted a new trial as a result of
an appellate determination that prejudicial hearsay had been admitted in his first
trial . .. double jeopardy may not be invoked as a bar to his retrial.").
42. See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824) (holding that
court may discharge jury before verdict only if there is manifest necessity); see also
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978) ("The prosecutor must demon-
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mistrial.43 While barring retrial in some situations, these rules con-
template that a defendant who is convicted on sufficient evidence
and demonstrates error in the trial will not be discharged but will
be retried.
The difficult question raised by Smith is whether the prosecu-
tion violates the prohibition of double jeopardy if it injects unfair-
ness into the trial to ensure a conviction, or at least to avoid an
acquittal. Unlike government manipulation to obtain a second trial
at which to pursue the public interest, such behavior does not con-
template that an additional proceeding will be required to achieve
the prosecution's goal of conviction. In this situation, the public in-
terest in convicting the defendant will be adequately served by the
first trial. However, the defendant's interest in a fair trial cannot be
served without an additional proceeding. The Double Jeopardy
Clause does not primarily protect the defendant's interest in a fair
trial. That protection lies elsewhere in the Constitution.44 The
question, then, is whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits
the prosecution from conditioning the defendant's access to a fair
trial on the defendant's willingness to endure a second trial.
The established double jeopardy rules set out above have lim-
ited utility in solving the problem raised by Smith. These rules have
developed in response to cases in which the conduct or other cir-
cumstances supporting the defendant's double jeopardy argument
were fully apparent at the first trial. For example, in the mistrial
cases, an error or event is identified during trial and allegedly in-
fects the proceedings.45 When the trial judge rules on the mistrial
motion, the judge, the prosecutor and the defendant are 'all fully
apprised of the basis for the motion, and each can assess whether
the trial is so tainted that it must be aborted or whether some less
drastic solution will serve the defendant's interest and the ends of
justice.
The existing rules do not apply when, as in Smith, government
misconduct remains undetected throughout the first trial and is
then invoked as the basis for a double jeopardy bar. Indeed, those
43. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679 (1982) (holding that double
jeopardy bars retrial if "the conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mis-
trial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial"); Common-
wealth v. Lively, 610 A.2d 7, 9 (Pa. 1992) (holding that retrial is barred if
defendant intentionally was provoked into moving for mistrial).
44. For example, both the general right to due process of law and the Sixth
Amendment guarantees of confrontation, compulsory process and assistance of
counsel protect the defendant's interest in a fair trial.
45. For a discussion of cases involving mistrials, see supra notes 42-43.
[Vol. 39: p. 627
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rules are designed to protect a defendant from government use of
process to force a defendant through successive trials, either to
avoid a likely acquittal through a mistrial or for the purpose of har-
assment.46 The Supreme Court has not evaluated the defendant's
double jeopardy interest when an error, not calculated to force a
second trial, seriously compromises the first trial but is kept secret
until after the verdict. Reading Smith, one must ask whether apply-
ing double jeopardy to this situation draws double jeopardy juris-
prudence too far away from its intended area of application and
inappropriately employs principles that have been developed for
other situations.
To determine whether double jeopardy has an appropriate
role in resolving the defendant's claim, we must scrutinize the rea-
sons behind the rule. The Court has articulated a number of inter-
ests that underlie double jeopardy protection. 47 Three must be
46. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 342 (1975) (noting that Double
Jeopardy Clause was directed at "threat of multiple prosecutions").
47. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1980) (noting that
double jeopardy preserves finality ofjudgments, serves as barrier to affording pros-
ecutors another opportunity to supply evidence absent from first proceeding and
protects defendant's right to have trial completed by particular tribunal); Crist v.
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) (recognizing that double jeopardy preserves finality of
judgments, prevents prosecutors from making repeated attempts to convict for
same offense and protects interest of accused in retaining chosen jury); Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) ("The underlying idea ... is that the
State... should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual
for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarassment, expense and
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,
as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty."); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) (indicating that right to have trial
completed by particular tribunal is protected by Double Jeopardy Clause); United
States v. Ball, 163 U.Si 662 (1896) (noting that allowing defendant to be brought
into danger more than once for same offense is very similar to permitting party to
take advantage of its own wrong). See generally JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY*
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY (1969) (noting that double jeop-
ardy protects interests in avoiding unnecessary harassment, avoiding social stigma,
economy of time and money, and interest in psychological security); James F. Pon-
soldt, Mhen Guilt Should Be Irrelevant: Government Overreaching as a Bar to Reprosecu-
tion Under the Double Jeopardy Clause After Oregon v. Kennedy, 69 CORNELL L. REV.
76, 89 (1983) (indicating that double jeopardy protects defendant's interest in
particular forum and avoidance of governmental overreaching); George C.
Thomas III, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 827 (discussing
that double jeopardy promotes verdict finality and limits multiple punishments);
Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978
Sup. CT. REV. 81 (indicating that three main interests are protected by Double
Jeopardy Clause: interest in finality, interest in avoiding double punishment and
interest in nullification or allowing system to acquit against evidence); Donald E.
Burton, Note, A Closer Look at the Supreme Court and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 805 (1988) (noting that Double Jeopardy Clause implicates five
interests: (1) protecting finality of verdicts, (2) preventing prosecutors from wear-
ing down innocent defendants, (3) protecting integrity of jury acquittals, (4)
1994]
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considered here. First, like the doctrine of res judicata, double
jeopardy preserves the finality ofjudgments.48 It permits a winning
party to invoke its final judgment to bar further proceedings in the
same case. Second, double jeopardy protects the defendant's "val-
ued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal."49
Whereas res judicata serves only to protect the finality of judg-
ments, double jeopardy also protects the criminal defendant's in-
terest in having the case resolved by the first empaneled fact-
finder.50 Unlike res judicata, double jeopardy bars further pro-
ceedings in some cases in which no verdict was obtained from the
initial fact-finder.51 Third, double jeopardy protects the defendant
from "harassing exposure to the harrowing experience of a crimi-
nal trial."52 It shields the defendant's interest in freedom from un-
dergoing the stress of successive trials. Of these three interests, the
latter two provide the strongest support for the argument that an
unfair conviction can implicate the defendant's double jeopardy in-
terest. As the following discussion illustrates, an assessment of the
impact of an unfair conviction on the defendant reveals that serious
misconduct in a completed trial can implicate these double jeop-
ardy interests. Nevertheless, double jeopardy principles should be
applied only rarely to bar reprosecution after conviction. The in-
terests, while implicated, are not strongly threatened by misconduct
in this context. Except in unusual cases, the remedy of a total bar
preventing judges from imposing punishments not authorized by legislation and
(5) preventing excessive prosecutorial discretion); MaryJ. Fahey, Comment, Double
jeopardy: An Illusory Remedy for Governmental Overreaching at Trial 29 BUFF. L. REV.
759, 761 (1980) (discussing defendant's interest in being judged by first tribunal).
48. See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 128 (recognizing that one purpose of Double
Jeopardy Clause is to preserve finality of judgments); United States v. Scott, 437
U.S. 82, 92 (1978) (noting that "the primary purpose of the Double Jeopardy
Clause [is] to protect the integrity of a final judgment"); Crist, 437 U.S. at 33 (not-
ing that primary purpose of Double Jeopardy Clause is to preserve finality of
judgments).
49. Wade, 336 U.S. at 689; see Crist, 487 U.S. at 35-36 (discussing need to pro-
tect interest of accused in retaining chosen jury).
50. See Crist, 487 U.S. at 35-36.
51. See, e.g., United States v.Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971) (plurality opinion)
(discussing when mistrial granted without defendant's consent bars retrial);
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737-38 (1963) (holding that double jeop-
ardy barred retrial of defendant after mistrial precipitated by absence of prosecu-
tion witness). See generally Steven A. Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1365 (1987) (discussing when retrial may
follow mistrial without infringing upon defendant's double jeopardy rights).
52. Crist, 437 U.S. at 38; see Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957)
(noting that prosecutors should be restricted from making repeated attempts to
convict).
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rather than a retrial overvalues the defendant's interest and under-
values the public's interest.
A. Finality
The original purpose of double jeopardy protection and its
predecessors was to preserve the finality ofjudgments. 53 An acquit-
tal is absolutely final.54 A conviction is final unless the defendant
challenges it.55 Still, doublejeopardy does not absolutely forbid the
government from subjecting a defendant to successive proceedings.
For example, the Supreme Court's narrow definition of "same of-
fense" leaves ample room for the government, regardless of motive,
to subject the defendant to successive proceedings based on a sin-
gle criminal episode. 56 Nevertheless, if the offenses are the "same
offense" within the meaning of double jeopardy, the interest in fi-
nality is served by the assurance that no further proceedings may be
brought while a valid final judgment exists, whether an acquittal or
a conviction. 57
The starting point in a case like Smith is the rule of United States
v. Ball.58 In Ball, the Court held that if a defendant successfully
challenges a conviction, the slate is wiped clean; there is no final
judgment, and further proceedings may take place.59 The Ball
Court stated the rule but neglected to articulate the underlying rea-
soning. The Court devoted no more than a paragraph to the prop-
osition, merely declaring that "it is quite clear that a defendant,
53. For a brief discussion of double jeopardy as a preserver of the finality of
judgments, see supra note 48.
54. For a list of cases that discuss the finality of acquittals, see supra note 38.
55. See Thomas, supra note 47, at 854 (noting that "undisturbed" verdicts are
final but that convictions are sometimes overturned).
56. See United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2864 (1993) (rejecting "same
conduct" test established in Grady v. Corbin), ovmuling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S.
508 (1989); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (reasoning
that "where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statu-
tory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses
or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other
does not"); see also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970)'. In Ashe v. Swenson, the
Court held that successive prosecutions of the defendant arising from a single
criminal episode were barred only because the first trial resolved the issue of iden-
tity in the defendant's favor and therefore gave the defendant the benefit of collat-
eral estoppel. Id. at 445. The Court concluded that the separate indictments did
not charge the same offense, and, had the first trial not precluded further litiga-
tion of the issue of identity, the prosecution would have been free to try the de-
fendant on each indictment regardless of motive. Id. at 446.
57. See Thomas, supra note 47, at 854-55 (noting that unreversed convictions
and acquittals are final).
58. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
59. Id. at 672.
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who procures ajudgment against him upon an indictment to be set
aside, may be tried anew upon the same indictment, or upon an-
other indictment, for the same offence [sic] of which he had been
convicted."60 In later decisions, the Court provided the missing jus-
tification for the Ball rule. In United States v. Tateo,61 the Court
stated:
While different theories have been advanced to support
the permissibility of retrial, of greater importance than the
conceptual abstractions employed to explain the Ball prin-
ciple are the implications of that principle for the sound
administration of justice. Corresponding to the right of
an accused to be given a fair trial is the societal interest in
punishing one whose guilt is clear after he has obtained
such a trial. It would be a high price indeed for society to
pay were every accused granted immunity from punish-
ment because of any defect sufficient to constitute revers-
ible error in the proceedings leading to conviction. From
the standpoint of a defendant, it is at least doubtful that
appellate courts would be as zealous as they now are in
protecting against the effects of improprieties at the trial
or pretrial stage if they knew that reversal of a conviction
would put the accused irrevocably beyond the reach of
further prosecution. In reality, therefore, the practice of
retrial serves defendants' rights as well as society's
interest.62
The Court thus recognized both a strong governmental interest in
retrial that weighs against the defendant's interest in freedom from
successive prosecutions, and a practical concern that appellate
courts would be reluctant to recognize error if the price would be
60. Id.
61. 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
62. Id. at 466; see Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (describing
reasoning of Tateo as "the most reasonable justification"); see also Tibbs v. Florida,
457 U.S. 31, 40 (1982).
In Tibbs v. Forida, the Court recognized the Tateo and Burks justification for
the rule in Bag, but also stated as a second reason for the rule that "the Court has
concluded that retrial after reversal of a conviction is not the type of governmental
oppression targeted by the Double Jeopardy Clause." Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 40; see also
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 131 (1980) (noting that rule was sup-
ported by high price society would pay if defendants were immune from punish-
ment as well as by lack of government oppression); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S.
82, 91 (1978) (stating that retrial after defendant upsets first conviction on appeal
is not act of government oppression prohibited by Double Jeopardy Clause).
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discharge of the defendant rather than retrial.63
Thus, the rule reflects a practical balance between the defend-
ant's double jeopardy interests and the public's interest in punish-
ing the guilty defendant. Also implicated is an assessment of the
oppressiveness of the retrial. The balance may be struck differently
given facts like those of Smith. In Smith, the level of government
infraction goes beyond ordinary reversible error and arguably war-
rants requiring society to pay the high price of dismissal for the
misconduct of its prosecutorial agents. In addition, forcing the de-
fendant to endure retrial after reversal due to, egregious miscon-
duct may be viewed as significantly more oppressive than retrial
after a routine reversal.64 Unusual governmental misconduct like
that in Smith may therefore require that the Ball rule give way to an
exception.
To date, however, the only exception to the Ball rule recog-
nized by the Court is the exception established in Burks v. United
States.65 In Burks, the Court held that reprosecution is barred when
a conviction is reversed because it was not supported by sufficient
evidence. 66 Burks rests on the proposition that the defendant
should not be subject to further proceedings because the defend-
ant's first trial should have ended in an acquittal.6 7 The trial court,
having before it the prosecution's case, ruled erroneously when it
denied the defendant's motion for acquittal. 68 In Burks, the Court
specifically distinguished reversals based upon insufficient evidence
from those based upon trial error, such as prosecutorial miscon-
duct, which might necessitate reversal but would not bar a new
trial.69 As the Court noted, trial error "implies nothing with -respect
to the guilt or innocence of the defendant."70 For example, the
misconduct in Smith would not have mandated discharge of the de-
fendant had it been discovered during the trial. At most, the de-
fendant would have received the benefit of the exculpatory
evidence and, perhaps, some remedial action against the prosecu-
tion. The defense might then have prevailed, but the law does not
63. See Ponsoldt, supra note 47, at 88 (criticizing Ball as unjustified incursion
on defendant's double jeopardy protection). .
64. For a discussion of reversal due to egregious conduct compared to a rou-
tine reversal, see infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
65. 437 U.S. 1 (1977).
66. Id. at 18.
67. Id. at 16.
68. Id. at i1.
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compel that result in the way the law compelled the acquittal in
Burks. It is also possible that the defendant would have been con-
victed despite early discovery of the prosecution misconduct and
the suppressed exculpatory evidence. Thus the Burks decision does
not support the argument that double jeopardy bars reprosecution
in the Smith case.
Moreover, the rules do not address covert prosecutorial mis-
conduct. When an appellate court reverses a conviction due to in-
sufficient evidence and thereby raises a double jeopardy bar to
further proceedings, the court relies exclusively on facts that were
known to the trial judge and the parties during the trial.71 During
the trial, the parties argued and the trial judge assessed the suffi-
ciency of the evidence. A reversal for insufficient evidence reflects
the appellate court's disagreement with the trial court's evaluation
of the sufficiency of the evidence. 72 Indeed, in Lockhart v. Nelson,73
the Supreme Court held that double jeopardy does not bar further
proceedings when the appellate court rules that evidence, essential
to the prosecution's case, was erroneously admitted at trial.74 The
Court explained that in Burks, the appellate court reviewed the
same quantum of evidence as had the trial court.75 In Lockhart, the
Court assumed that, had the trial court excluded the challenged
evidence, it would have given the prosecution an opportunity to fill
the resulting gap with admissible evidence. 76 Therefore, by permit-
ting a new hearing, the Court "merely recreates the situation that
would have been obtained if the trial court had excluded the evi-
dence." 77 Thus, the Lockhart Court declined to assess the suffi-
ciency of the evidence on the basis of an evidentiary ruling that had
not been contemplated by the trial court or the prosecutor, and
would have changed the evidence before the trial court. Burks did
not control in Lockhart because the prosecution had produced suffi-
cient evidence before the trial court.
In addition, when the error requiring reversal does not reflect
71. See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 42 (1988) (noting that reviewing
court must consider same "quantum" of evidence as trial court).
72. See id. at 39 (noting that when appellate court reversed based on insuffi-
ciency of evidence, trial court should have entered acquittal); Burks, 437 U.S. at 16-
17 (noting that trial court and appellate court must apply same standard when
evaluating sufficiency of evidence).
73. 488 U.S. 33 (1988).
74. Id. at 34.
75. Id. at 42.
76. Id. The Court found that "the trial judge would presumably have allowed
the prosecution an opportunity to offer admissible evidence." Id.
77. Id.
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a weakness in the prosecution's case, one'basis for the Burks excep-
tion is missing. Like the rule guaranteeing the absolute finality of
acquittals, Burks rests, at least in part, on a concern that the prose-
cution could make a weak initial evidentiary presentation and then
employ a retrial to strengthen its case.78 To permit retrial would
therefore entail the risk that the government would convict an in-
nocent person. A case like Smith represents a different situation
altogether. In Smith, the undetected government misconduct cre-
ated the risk that an innocent person would be convicted in the first
trial. If retrial is permitted, the prosecution's case is likely to be-
come weaker, rather than stronger, because the defendant now has
the exculpatory evidence)' 9 If the evidence is as powerful as the
defendant contends, the new trial should lead to an acquittal.
The double jeopardy argument in the Smith case thus gains lit-
tle support from the rules developed to protect the interest in the
finality of judgments. A defendant who is convicted after a com-
plete trial cannot normally complain that the double jeopardy in-
terest in the finality of the verdict is disserved when the verdict is
overturned and retrial permitted. Although a defendant who was
the victim of covert government misconduct may credibly argue
that a different balance should be struck, the defendant must iden-
tify stronger double jeopardy interests that tip the balance. There-
fore, the defendant's doublejeopardy argument must rest to a large
extent on other double jeopardy interests.
B. First Fact-Finder
The defendant's double jeopardy interest in having the case
resolved by the initial fact-finder is stressed in many of the decisions
considering whether terminating the first trial before a verdict bars
retrial.8 0 At first glance, it may appear that the interest in resolu-
78. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (holding that Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits second trial because second trial gives prosecution op-
portunity to present evidence not presented in first trial).
79. The district court noted this distinction in Buffington v. Copeland, 687 F.
Supp. 1089, 1094 (W.D. Tex. 1988). The Buffington court observed that:
[I]t is difficult to imagine that the government in this case will be ad-
vantaged in a second trial. If anything, the government's case may be
significantly weaker due to the lapse of time and the fact that the defend-
ant will be able to effectively cross-examine [the witness whose impeach-
ment material was concealed].
Id.
80. See, e.g., Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 36 (1978) (holding that defendant's
"valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal" is within protec-
tion of Double Jeopardy Clause); Arizona v. Washingt6n, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978)
(holding that right to have trial completed by particular tribunal is constitutionally
1994]
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tion of the case by the first fact- finder is not threatened when the
defendant receives a complete trial, albeit flawed by undetected
governmental misconduct, and the fact-finder returns a verdict of
guilty. On closer examination, however, it appears that the govern-
ment's conduct interferes substantially with the defendant's interest
in the first fact-finder. Whether that interference warrants a double
jeopardy bar is another question.
The Court recognizes that a defendant's doublejeopardy inter-
est in having the case resolved by the first fact-finder is threatened
when circumstances prevent the fact-finder from reaching a verdict
in the case.81 However, the weight of that double jeopardy interest
is often insufficient to generate a double jeopardy bar.8 2 Even if
the defendant does not agree to the mid-trial termination, the gov-
ernment interest may outweigh the defendant's interest in having
the case resolved by the first fact-finder.83 If the jury is deadlocked,
for example, the trial court can declare a mistrial and order a new
trial.8 4 Similarly, if a mistrial is manifestly necessary because of cir-
cumstances that taint the trial and make a fair resolution of the case
impossible, the trial court can declare a mistrial without raising a
double jeopardy bar.8 5 In these situations, the defendant's interest
protected); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973) (noting that interest of
defendant in having fate determined by initial jury is weighty one); Wade v.
Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949) (recognizing defendant's "valued right" to have
trial completed by particular jury).
81. See, e.g., Crist, 437 U.S. at 35 (concluding that double jeopardy interest
implicated when case was dismissed due to typographical error in information af-
ter jury was empaneled and sworn); Washington, 434 U.S. at 511 (finding no viola-
tion of double jeopardy right when mistrial resulted from improper opening
statement by defense); Somerville, 410 U.S. at 471 (finding no violation of double
jeopardy right when mistrial resulted from defect in indictment); Wade, 336 U.S. at
684 (concluding that no double jeopardy violation occurred.when first court-mar-
tial dissolved due to military necessity).
82. See, e.g., Washiigton, 434 U.S. at 511 (finding no violation of double jeop-
ardy when mistrial resulted from improper opening statement by defense); Somer-
ville, 410 U.S. at 471 (holding that "where the declaration of a mistrial implements
a reasonable state policy and aborts a proceeding'that ... could have been upset at
will by one of the parties, the defendant's interest in proceeding to verdict is out-
weighed by the competing and equally legitimate demand for public justice").
83. See Washington, 434 U.S. at 516 (noting that " 'the public's interest in fair
trials designed to end in just judgments' must prevail over the defendant's 'valued
right' to have his trial concluded before the first jury impaneled") (citation
omitted).
84. See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824) (holding that
discharge of jury without defendant's consent, because jury was unable to agree,
was not bar to new trial); see also United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130
(1980) (noting that retrial is permitted after mistrial due to hung jury).
85. See Washington, 434 U.S. at 516 (holding that improper opening statement
by defense created manifest necessity for mistrial so retrial was permitted); Reiss,
supra note 51, at 1424 (stating that constitutionality of retrial turns on whether
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in having the case resolved by the first fact-finder is insufficient to
support a double jeopardy bar to retrial.
In cases applying the manifest necessity test, governmental
overreaching has been a significant factor favorable to the defend-
ant seeking a double jeopardy bar to retrial. 86 Government over-
reaching has also been a key factor in defining when retrial is
barred, even though the defendant consented to a mistrial. Nor-
mally, if the defendant consents to the mistrial or asks for some
other form of mid-trial resolution, that action signals the defend-
ant's "deliberate election . . . to forgo" the right to resolution by
the first fact-finder and no double jeopardy bar arises.87 In Oregon
v. Kennedy,88 the Court refined the standard to determine when a
defense-requested mistrial raises a double jeopardy bar. The Ken-
nedy majority emphasized that the defendant, by moving for the
mistrial, chose to forgo the interest in the first fact-finder.8 9 The
Court remarked that "[t] he important consideration, for purposes
of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary
control over the course to be followed in the event of
[prosecutorial] error."90 The Court rejected the argument that the
mistrial should bar further proceedings if the mistrial was
prompted by prosecutorial overreaching. Instead, the Court held
that the mistrial raised a double jeopardy bar only if the prosecutor
intended to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial. 91
Kennedy reflects the Court's assessment of the weight of the de-
fendant's interest in the first fact-finder. The defendant who makes
mistrial was granted as result of manifest necessity). See generally Comment, Double
Jeopardy and Reprosecution After Mistrial: Is the Manifest Necessity Test Manifestly Neces-
sary? 69 Nw. U. L. REv. 887 (1975) (discussing development of manifest necessity
standard).
86. See generally StephenJ. Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. PA. L. REv.
449, 471-93 (1977) (discussing application of manifest necessity doctrine);
Thomas, supra note 47, at 871 ("The [government oppression] theory... reduces
finality to a determination of whether the prosecutor's conduct overreaches in a
particular case."); Comment, supra note 85, at 910 (proposing that intentional mis-
conduct by prosecutor aimed at inducing mistrial should bar further prosecution
irrespective of whether defendant consents to mistrial).
87. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93 (1978).
88. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
89. Id. at 676. The Court found that "[a] defendant's motion for mistrial
constitues 'a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his
guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact.' " Id. (citation
omitted).
90. Id. (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 (1976)). See gener-
ally Fahey, supra note 47, at 763-67 (discussing Supreme Court's emphasis on de-
fendant's choice).
91. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 679.
1994]
19
Poulin: The Limits of Double Jeopardy: A Course into the Dark
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
ViLLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39: p. 627
a meaningful choice to abort the trial effectively relinquishes that
double jeopardy interest. Similarly, in United States v. Scott,92 the
Court also emphasized that it was the defendant's choice to seek
mid-trial termination of the proceedings. 9 The Court went on to
hold that the government could appeal the trial court's ruling in
the defendant's favor, even though a new trial would be necessary if
the government prevailed on appeal. 94
If the case goes to verdict, however, the questions are some-
what different. If misconduct taints the trial, but the trial court de-
nies the defendant's request for a mistrial and lets the case proceed
to verdict, the double jeopardy analysis may change. In Kennedy,
the Court did not consider whether, in that situation, the defend-
ant could raise a double jeopardy bar.95 Courts discussing this situ-
ation have generally come to the conclusion that the Kennedy test
applies, although none have barred retrial on that basis.96 These
92. 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
93. Id. at 99.
94. See id. ("In [this] situation, the defendant [is] not... deprived of [the]
option to go to the first jury .... .") (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470,
484 (1971)). Similarly, in Tibbs v. Flo-ida, the Court held that double jeopardy did
not bar retrial after the state appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction
on the grounds that the conviction was against the weight of the evidence. 457
U.S. 31, 42 (1982). In Tibbs, the defendant chose to persuade the appellate court
to disagree with the first fact-finder and reverse the conviction. Id. at 47. Conse-
quently, the defendant received "a second opportunity." Id. at 44. Because the
defendant persuaded the appellate court that the fact-finder had improperly as-
sessed the evidence, he could not successfully complain that his double jeopardy
protection precluded a retrial. Id. at 47. The Supreme Court viewed the result as
analogous to a hung jury, rather than an acquittal based on insufficient evidence.
Id. at 42.
95. 456 U.S. 667 (1982). In Kennedy, a defendant who was granted a mistrial
by the trial court attempted to raise a double jeopardy bar to further prosecution.
Id.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Singer, 785 F.2d 228, 241 (8th Cir.) (holding that
retrial was proper course after reversal of conviction when prior defense motion
for mistrial was denied), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Robinson v. Wade, 686
F.2d 298, 310 (5th Cir. 1982) (allowing retrial after denial of defense motion to
dismiss); United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d 769, 778 (3d Cir.) (allowing retrial after
denial of defense motion for mistrial), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018 (1982); United
States v. Singleterry, 683 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir.) ("[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause
is concerned only with prosecutorial conduct that is intended to provoke a mis-
trial. When a mistrial is not declared, the prosecutor's efforts have been unsuccess-
ful."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021 (1982); Gully v. Kunzman, 592 F.2d 283, 289 (6th
Cir.) (rejecting analogy between reversal prompted by prosecutorial misconduct
and mistrial provoked by prosecutorial misconduct), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 924
(1979); Buffington v. Copeland, 687 F. Supp. 1089, 1092 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (hold-
ing that prosecutorial misconduct not resulting in mistrial does not bar retrial).
See generally Ponsoldt, supra note 47, at 89-91 (proposing rule to eliminate distinc-
tion between mistrial and appellate reversal cases where government overreaching
has occurred); Fahey, supra note 47, at 774 ("The threshold argument could be
that the trial court erred in denying the mistrial motion, and that if the appellate
20
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courts assume that double jeopardy will bar reprosecution if the
conviction is reversed due to prosecutorial error that was intended
to, and did in fact, provoke the defendant to move for a mistrial.
The courts have articulated two reasons for this conclusion: the per-
ceived need for consistency in outcome regardless of when the im-
propriety of the prosecution's behavior is recognized,9 7 and the
practical implications of permitting the trial court to avoid a double
jeopardy bar merely by denying the defendant's motion for
mistrial. 98
The defendant's constitutional protection in this situation
should also be analyzed in reference to the interests that underlie
Kennedy-the defendant's double jeopardy interest in the first fact-
finder and the prosecution's interest in retrying the defendant. The
level of constitutional protection afforded the defendant is deter-
mined by a balancing of these interests. For example, the defend-
ant signals a lack of interest in the first fact-finder, upon a showing
of prosecutorial misconduct. In addition, by engaging in miscon-
duct intended to precipitate a mistrial, the prosecution has weak-
ened its claim to an interest in retrial.
The situation becomes even more complex when, as in Smith,
the fact-finder is tainted by undiscovered government misconduct
and the defendant therefore has no chance to choose whether to
proceed to verdict with the first fact-finder despite that taint. The
trial proceeds to verdict with the first fact-finder because the de-
fendant is ignorant of the misconduct. Yet the defendant, while
receiving a verdict, loses the benefit of the first fact-finder in a sig-
nificant sense.9 The government's action deprives the fact-finder's
court found that the mistrial motion by the defendant had been provoked by gov-
ernmental overreaching, the conviction should be reversed, and retrial
prohibited.").
97. See Robinson, 686 F.2d at 306-08 (noting that it should not matter at what
point in judicial process mistrial motion is found to be "meritorious"); Curtis, 683
F.2d at 774 ("It would appear inconsistent to afford a defendant less constitutional
protection simply because a trial judge erred in denying a mistrial request."); Sin-
gletery, 683 F.2d at 124 ("It seems anomalous to say that identical prosecutorial
misconduct will create a constitutional bar to retrial when the district court grants
a mistrial, but not when the district court erroneously denies the mistrial
request.").
98. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676 (observing that "the judge ... might well be
more loath to grant a defendant's motion for mistrial"); Curtis, 683 F.2d at 775
(noting that trial court could ensure retrial by denying any motion for mistrial
during trial).
99. See Schulhofer, supra note 86, at 535. Professor Schulhofer characterizes
the defendant's interest recognized by the Court as "pursuing the first trial to com-
pletion when this course appears tactically advantageous." Id. In a case like Smith,
the government's improper conduct misleads the defendant into believing that
completing the first trial is tactically advantageous. If the defendant knew that the
1994] 647
21
Poulin: The Limits of Double Jeopardy: A Course into the Dark
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
verdict of its validity. On one hand, the defendant has lost a possi-
ble acquittal. The government foreclosed that possibility both by
suppressing information that might have swayed the jury to acquit
and by creating a false impression at trial that may have swayed the
jury to convict. On the other hand, the prosecution deprived the
defendant of the opportunity to settle the case through a fair con-
viction.100 The misconduct prevents the fact-finder from function-
ing appropriately and renders the opportunity to complete the trial
before that fact-finder illusory. Thus, like the conduct in some mis-
trial cases, the intentional government conduct in a case like Smith
raises double jeopardy concerns because it manipulates the judicial
process in order to prevent the defendant from receiving a fair trial
with the first fact-finder.
In addition, the government interest in retrial is. likely to be
weaker when covert misconduct leads to a reversal, as compared
with the situation where a case ends in mistrial. In Smith, for exam-
ple, the prosecution had one full opportunity to present the case to
the jury. Nothing in the first trial was unfair to the prosecution.
Thus, "the public interest in affording the prosecutor one full and
fair opportunity" to present evidence to the jury was fully served by
the trial court's conduct of the trial.' 0 ' Only the prosecutor's care-
fully concealed and late-detected misconduct interfered with that
interest. Consequently, the interference with the defendant's inter-
est in resolution of the case by the first fact-finder is not counter-
balanced by any strong government interest, and, therefore, may
warrant double jeopardy protection.
This interference with the performance of the first fact-finder
may violate the defendant's double jeopardy rights. The problem is
to determine when government misconduct so hobbles the jury
that the defendant cannot be said to have received the benefit of
the first fact-finder and further proceedings would violate the de-
fendant's double jeopardy protection. Taken to its logical extreme,
this reasoning suggests that any reversible government error bars
retrial. The Court has long since rejected that position.'02 Thus,
double jeopardy provides a useful analytical tool and source of pro-
fact-finder would reach its verdict without significant exculpatory evidence, the de-
fendant might well assess the wisdom of proceeding to verdict in that trial
differently.
100. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486 (1971) (plurality opinion).
In Jorn, Justice Harlan recognized that the defendant has a double jeopardy inter-
est "once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society through the ver-
dict of a tribunal he might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate." Id.
101. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978).
102. For a discussion of the government's right to retry a defendant whose
[Vol. 39: p. 627
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tection only if a principled standard can be articulated that defines
when government misconduct rises to a level that implicates double
jeopardy protection. Section II, below, discusses possible ways to
approach this task.
C. Freedom from the Burden of Repeated Trials
The government is normally entitled to try the defendant
once, but only once, to verdict. The Court in Green v. United
States'03 stated:
[T]he State with all its resources and'power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individ-
ual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to em-
barrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well
as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he
may be found guilty.104
This point was emphasized in Arizona v. Washington,105 where
the Court observed that the government is entitled to "one, and
only one, opportunity to require an accused to stand trial."10 6 Simi-
larly, in United States v. Scott, the Court noted that the government
has an interest in one full and fair opportunity to present the evi-
dence to the jury.10 7
In limited circumstances, however, the Double Jeopardy Clause
permits the government to try a defendant more than once for the
same offense.10 8 In many instances, a defendant whose first trial
ends in mistrial may be retried. Moreover, as noted above, a de-
fendant who persuades the courts to reverse a conviction may also
be retried. 10 9 The government is permitted to strike "hard but fair
conviction is reversed due to trial error, see supra notes 58-62 and accompanying
text.
103. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
104. Id. at 187-88.
105. 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
106. Id. at 505.
107. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 100 (1978).
108. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 463 (1964) (holding that "retrial
of a defendant whose conviction is set aside on collateral attack for error in the
proceedings leading to conviction is not barred for double jeopardy.").
109. The defendant's request wipes the slate clean and the government inter-
est in a fair opportunity to prove its case outweighs the defendant's double jeop-
ardy interest in avoiding successive trials. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 12
(1978) (noting that when defendant obtains reversal of conviction on grounds
other than insufficient evidence, new trial does not violate double jeopardy rights);
Tateo, 377 U.S. at 465 ("[double jeopardy] does not preclude the Government's
1994] 649
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blows."110 Thus, retrial is permitted even if the conviction is re-
versed because the prosecution's adversarial zeal at the first trial
won erroneous rulings from the trial court on questions of admissi-
bility of evidence and propriety of conduct.
The double jeopardy analysis should change however, when
the reversal results from the government's covert misconduct. The
defendant has a strong interest in avoiding the stress, expense and
anxiety of the second trial. l ' A conviction followed by a waiting
period and a new trial prolongs the defendant's oppression and
anxiety, leaving the defendant under the cloud of his or her initial
conviction.1 12 The burden on a defendant who must vindicate the
interest in a fair trial, by facing another trial, is far more onerous
than the burden imposed on a defendant whose first trial is termi-
nated through mistrial in its early stages and is quickly succeeded by
a new trial."13
In addition, the countervailing government interest is less com-
pelling when there is covert government misconduct than after a
more usual reversal of a conviction. The hidden nature of the mis-
conduct places responsibility for the reversal solely on the govern-
ment. The government's deceit deprives the trial court of the
opportunity to address and resolve the problem in a manner that
avoids the need for two trials."l 4 This deception also deprives the
retrying a defendant whose conviction is set aside ...."); United States v. Ball, 163
U.S. 662, 672 (1896) ("[I]t is quite clear that a defendant, who procures ajudg-
ment against him ... to be set aside, may be tried anew... for the same offense
. . . . 1)).
110. United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1439 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that
prosecution's aggressive closing arguments were fair).
111. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (recognizing that
one concept underlying Double Jeopardy Clause "is that the State with all its re-
sources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarassment, ex-
pense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity").
112. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 323-24 (Pa. 1992). In Smith,
the defendant was sentenced to death. Id. The Commonwealth continued to
press for the death penalty while attempting to sustain its ill-gotten conviction on
appeal. Id. at 324.
113. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 470 (1973) (permitting new trial
after court declared mistrial due to defective indictment; court granted new trial
after jury was sworn but before evidence was presented).
114. By contrast, most errors must be raised at trial to avoid waiver. This pro-
vides the trial court an opportunity to address the defendant's claim that the gov-
ernment's behavior is improper and, if necessary, remedy the problem in the first
trial. Thus, if the trial proceeds and the defendant is convicted, both the court
and the prosecution have taken a position on the legality of the aspect of the trial
raised as error on appeal. Only plain error is exempt from this requirement. The
rationale for the exemption is that the trial court should recognize the impropriety
650 [Vol. 39: p. 627
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defendant of the chance to argue the legal significance of the gov-
ernment misconduct and to propose remedies that could be imple-
mented in the first trial.
An argument against imposing a double jeopardy bar in this
context could be based on the absence of one risk of retrial that has
been stressed by the Court: The possibility that the government will
improve its case when the defendant is retried. 115 To the contrary,
the government's case will be weaker because the defendant now
has the previously concealed evidence. In some cases, the likeli-
hood of an improved government case has been treated as crucial
to the defendant's double jeopardy claim.' 6 This approach, how-
ever, undervalues the defendant's interest in freedom from the op-
pression, stress, anxiety and expense of enduring the second
trial." 7 When the government adopts deceptive tactics to avoid a
feared acquittal in the initial trial, forcing the defendant to endure
a second trial may violate the defendant's right to double jeopardy
protection.
II. LOOKING FOR A WORKABLE STANDARD
Forcing a defendant to endure a second trial because the first
trial was tainted by covert government misconduct thus implicates
two core double jeopardy interests.118 In some cases, a strong argu-
ment can be made that double jeopardy should bar further pro-
ceedings.1'9 The problem with this argument is differentiating
those instances from the more typical cases in which the remedy for
the government error is reversal and remand for retrial. If double
jeopardy principles require discharge in some cases, a principled
and workable standard must be defined to identify those cases.
of plain error, because it represents such a pronounced departure from permissi-
ble procedure.
115. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980) (noting that
one purpose of double jeopardy is to prevent prosecution from having opportunity
to produce additional evidence, thereby improving its case).
116. See Buffington v. Copeland, 687 F. Supp. 1089, 1095 (W.D. Tex. 1988)
(noting signifigance of whether prosecutor has more favorable opportunity to
convict).
117. For a case that discusses the defendant's interest in freedom from the
stress, anxiety and expense of second trial, see supra note 111.
118. For a discussion of the two core double jeopardy interests implicated by
covert prosecutorial misconduct, see supra notes 80-117 and accompanying text.
119. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 325 (Pa. 1992). The Smith
court accepted this argument, holding "the double jeopardy clause of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution prohibits retrial of a defendant.., when the conduct of the
prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point of
denial of a fair trial." Id.
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Certainly, double jeopardy should not bar reprosecution when the
prosecutorial error is merely a necessary incident of the adversarial
process. However, it should bar further prosecution if the
prosecutorial error sufficiently undermines the defendant's double
jeopardy interest in freedom from successive proceedings. Ulti-
mately, a workable standard must recognize the range of reasons
for multiple proceedings and differentiate among them on grounds
related to the basis of double jeopardy protection.
A. Intent Based Tests
Courts have gravitated toward intent-based tests to determine
when prosecutorial misconduct raises a double jeopardy bar to rep-
rosecution. 120 Indeed, the Smith court established an intent-based
test, holding that retrial is barred if "the conduct of the prosecutor
is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point
of the denial of a fair trial."121 Intent-based tests are attractive for
two reasons. First, a test based on prosecutorial intent limits the
number of cases in which the defendant will receive the drastic re-
lief of discharge. By requiring a finding of intent, the courts permit
retrial if inadvertent, or even grossly negligent, prosecutorial mis-
conduct has a deleterious impact on the defendant. Second, in-
tent-based tests offer practical advantages. A test based on
subjective prosecutorial intent is specific and, in one sense, easy to
apply because it turns on a determination of fact-the prosecutor's
intent. The trial court must make this factual determination. 122
120. For example, even the state courts applying a more protective standard
after Kennedy require a finding of prosecutorial intent. See Pool v. Superior Court,
677 P.2d 261, 271-72 (Ariz. 1984) (requiring "intentional conduct which the prose-
cutor knows to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any im-
proper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial or
reversal"); State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1327 (Or. 1983) (requiring "knowing
misconduct coupled with indifference toward the probable risk of a mistrial").
121. Smith, 615 A.2d at 325. Applying this test, the Smith court concluded that
a second trial would violate the appellant's double jeopardy rights under the Penn-
sylvania Constitution.
122. See State v. Rademacher, 433 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Iowa 1988) (holding
trend to be that "the finding of subjective intent ... must be made in the first
instance by the trial court"); People v. Dawson, 427 N.W.2d 886, 897 n.57 (Mich.
1988) (noting that "[prosecution) goad fed] the defendant into moving for a mis-
trial standard calls for a finding of fact by the court .... an inquiry for which the
trial court is best suited." (quoting United States v. Posner, 764 F.2d 1535, 1539
n.56 (11th Cir. 1985))). Petrucelli v. Smith provides interesting insight into the pro-
cess of making the required finding of prosecutorial intent. 544 F. Supp. 627
(W.D.N.Y. 1982), reconsidered sub nom. Petrucelli v. Coombe, 569 F. Supp. 1523
(W.D.N.Y. 1983), order vacated by, 735 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1984). Initially, the trial
court concluded that the prosecutor deliberately goaded the defendant into mov-
ing for a mistrial. Id. The trial court subsequently was persuaded to hold a hear-
652 [Vol. 39: p. 627
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Thus, the role of the appellate court in considering the issue is
limited.
However, intent-based tests generate certain problems. For ex-
ample, defendants and courts must grapple with the challenge of
discovering and assessing evidence of governmental intent. The
relative weight of subjective and objective indications of intent in a
particular case can be difficult to assess.123 Courts also must deter-
mine whether the prosecutor's intent alone is determinative or if
that of other government agents should be considered. 124 Despite
these potential problems, the courts have adopted tests based on
subjective prosecutorial intent.
A more important question is whether prosecutorial intent,
either subjective or objective, has a significant relationship to
double jeopardy interests and protection. The Double Jeopardy
Clause was included in the Bill of Rights in response to the fear that
the government would use its power to subject a defendant to re-
peated criminal proceedings. 125 Some courts have noted that a
central purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to protect the de-
fendant from the harassment of successive proceedings.12 6 The
courts often have read the term "harassment" to connote improper
prosecutorial intent or motivation, or governmental intent to ma-
nipulate the system to a defendant's detriment.127 However, the
ing and, after taking evidence on the issue, concluded that the prosecutor's intent
did not satisfy Kennedy. Coombe, 569 F. Supp. at 1523.
123. Compare Coombe, 569 F. Supp. at 1523 (holding that facts did not warrant
double jeopardy bar of defendant's second trial due to lack of prosecutorial bad
faith) with Smith, 544 F. Supp. at 627 (holding that inference of prosecutorial bad
faith was permissible due to prosecutorial misconduct that was "deliberate [and]
indefensible . . . throughout defendant's first trial"). For a discussion of intent
based tests, see generally Fahey, supra note 47, at 771-73; Reiss, supra note 51, at
1365-429.
124. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673-75 (1982). For example, Ken-
nedy focuses on the intent of the prosecutor and not on that of any other law
enforcement official. Id. In contrast, whether the failure to preserve evidence rep-
resents a violation of due process turns on the bad faith of the law enforcement
officers in the case. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (requiring
criminal defendant to show bad faith by police in order for failure to preserve
evidence to constitute violation of due process). For a discussion of the Kennedy
test, see generally Reiss, supra note 51, at 1425-29.
125. For a discussion of the origins of the Double Jeopardy Clause, see
SIGLER, supra note 47.
126. But see Frank Holleman, Mistrials and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 14 GA. L.
REv. 45, 76 (1979) (arguing that protecting defendant from harassment is not cen-
tral purpose of Double Jeopardy Clause).
127. See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1324 (Or. 1983) ("We agree
with the state, however, that a guarantee against 'harassment' implies a require-
ment of some conscious choice of prejudicial action... [niegligent error, 'gross'
or otherwise, is not enough.").
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language of the Fifth Amendment includes neither the term "har-
assment" nor any other term connoting the need for intent. 12 8 The
scope of constitutional protection thus turns on the prosecutor's
intent only if that intent itself has some effect on the existence or
weight of constitutionally protected interests.129
1. The Federal Standard: The Kennedy Test
In Oregon v. Kennedy,130 a plurality of the Supreme Court
adopted a test that bars retrial after a defense requested mistrial
only if the request for a mistrial was prompted by prosecutorial mis-
conduct intended to provoke a mistrial. This subjective intent test
reflects the Court's perception of the limited reach of double jeop-
ardy protection after the defendant elects to abort a trial.' 3 ' Ac-
cordingly, the defendant must demonstrate more than
governmental overreaching and efforts to secure an elusive convic-
tion. Under Kennedy, a double jeopardy bar arises only if the mis-
conduct was intended to generate a second chance to convict,
specifically by provoking a defense-requested mistrial.' 32
In Kennedy, the Court was drawn to the practical advantages of
an intent-based test, but also appeared to conclude that the prose-
cutor's intent has constitutional significance in defining the scope
of double jeopardy protection.13 3 A defendant who chooses to ter-
minate a trial before verdict normally forgoes any double jeopardy
interest in avoiding retrial.134 The Court has emphasized the im-
portance of the defendant's control of the decision to abort the
Even absent the intent to pursue improper goals, the government may precip-
itate multiple proceedings out of carelessness or overly aggressive prosecutorial
tactics. See id. at 1325. However, there are frequently governmental goals that
may generate improper motivation to bring successive prosecutions. See Common-
wealth v. Smith, 625 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. 1992). For example, three possible im-
proper motivations could cause the government to bring successive proceedings in
a case like Smith. First, the government might be persistently seeking an elusive
conviction. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Starks, 416 A.2d 498, 500 (Pa. 1980)).
Second, the government might merely be harassing and oppressing the defendant
without particular concern for conviction and punishment. Id. Third, while less
likely to be a motivating factor in Smith, the government might seek further pun-
ishment for the defendant after obtaining a conviction.
128. See U.S. CONsr. amend. V.
129. See Smith, 615 A.2d at 325 (holding that prosecutorial conduct at trial
implicated interests protected by Double Jeopardy Clause of Pennsylvania
Constitution).
130. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
131. Id. at 673.
132. Id. at 674.
133. Id. at 674-76.
134. Id. at 676. The Court found that "a defendant's motion for a mistrial
constitutes 'a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his
28
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trial.135 In the view of the Kennedy Court's holding however, inten-
tional prosecutorial efforts to provoke a mistrial deprive the de-
fendant of meaningful control over the decision to proceed to
verdict with the first fact-finder.13 6 Although some courts disagree
with the Court's assessment, the Kennedy test places prosecutorial
intent at the heart of the constitutional analysis.137 Consequently,
the Kennedy test gives the trial court control through a principled,
yet understandable, determination subject to limited review.138
While courts also have applied the Kennedy test to double jeop-
ardy claims based on error at trial that did not precipitate a mistrial,
this standard offers little guidance when the prosecutorial miscon-
duct remains undisclosed at trial.139 The Kennedy test turns entirely
on factors relevant only when the misconduct is discovered during
trial, primarily the defendant's control and the prosecutor's intent
to provoke a mistrial. 140 In contrast, covert misconduct does not
affect the defendant's control of the continuation of the trial and is
not driven by intent to provoke a mistrial. The prosecutor who en-
gages in such misconduct is not focused on the defendant's double
jeopardy interests or on a second chance to convict. Indeed, the
prosecutor who suppresses exculpatory information arguably does
not intend to avoid a verdict from an unfavorable fact-finder or
abort a trial that is going poorly.141 Instead, the prosecutor seeks to
guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact.'" Id. (quoting United
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93 (1978)).
135. Id. The Court noted that in the context of a mistrial due to
prosecutorial error, "It]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be
followed in the event of such error." Id. (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S.
600, 609 (1976)).
136. Id.
137. For a criticism of the Kennedy test, see Ponsoldt, supra note 47, at 94-100.
138. The standard for review is lenient. See, e.g., Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d
298, 309 (5th Cir. 1982) (clearly erroneous); United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d 769
(3d Cir.) (clearly erroneous), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018 (1982); People v. Dawson,
427 N.W.2d 886, 897 (Mich. 1988) (clearly erroneous); State v. Laster, 724 P.2d
721, 726 (Mont. 1986) (abuse of discretion). Even under this lenient standard, the
trial court will sometimes be reversed. See, e.g., Curtis, 683 F.2d at 778 (reversing
lower court decision under clearly erroneous standard).
139. For a discussion of the application of the Kennedy test where the trial
court does not grant a mistrial, see supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
140. Even when a Brady violation is discovered mid-trial, the court is unlikely
to conclude that the initial failure to disclose resulted from intent to generate a
mistrial. See State v. Williams, 478 So. 2d 983 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that bad
faith conduct by state was not intended to cause future mistrial), cert. denied, 483
So. 2d 1019 (La.) and cert. denied, 488 So. 2d 1029 (1986).
141. See United States v. Rivera, 634 F. Supp. 204, 211 (S.D.N.Y.) (concluding
that where trial court and prosecutor concealed information from defendants,
"the alleged intent was actually to prevent, not provoke, a mistrial at the defendants'
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guarantee and preserve the conviction at the first trial by gaining an
unfair evidentiary advantage that is concealed from the defendant
and the court.
In Buffington v. Copeland,142 the United States District Court for
the Western District of Texas applied the Kennedy test to facts simi-
lar to Smith and concluded that double jeopardy did not bar re-
trial. 143 In Buffington, the prosecution edited out key portions of a
prosecution witness' statement. 144 The misconduct impeded the
defendant's efforts to impeach the witness, but was not discovered
until after conviction. 145 The district court noted that the prosecu-
tor's "deplorable actions were motivated by a more general desire
to prejudice the defendant and obtain a conviction." 46 In addition
to concluding that the defendant had failed to satisfy the test de-
fined in Kennedy, the Buffington court remarked that mistrial was
not the likely remedy for the prosecutorial wrong, even if the de-
fendant and the court had discovered the misconduct during the
trial. 147 Thus, the intent-based test adopted for mistrials in Kennedy
offers no help in evaluating the double jeopardy claim of a defend-
ant in Smith's position.
2. The Pre-Kennedy Test
Prior to Kennedy, courts assumed that double jeopardy barred
reprosecution in a broader range of cases. The assumption rested
on dictum in United States v. Dinitz,' 48 in which the Supreme Court
condemned conduct intended to provoke a mistrial as well as con-
duct that threatened "harassment of an accused by successive prose-
cutions." 149 Some states have interpreted their constitutions as
barring retrial in this broader range of cases, still focusing in part
on the prosecutor's intent and attitude toward the risk of mistrial or
request," and that double jeopardy did not bar retrial (emphasis added)), aff'd,
801 F.2d 392 (2d Cir.), 802 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1986) and 812 F.2d 713 (2d Cir.
1987).
142. 687 F. Supp. 1089 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
143. Id. at 1092.
144. Id. at 1093.
145. Id. at 1090.
146. Id. at 1093; see also United States v. Singleterry, 683 F.2d 122, 124 (5th
Cir.) (remarking that "it seems unlikely that any prosecutor would intentionally lay
a basis for appellate reversal in order 'to subvert the protections afforded by the
Double Jeopardy Clause '), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021 (1982) (quoting Oregon v.
Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982)).
147. Buffington, 687 F. Supp. at 1093 n.2.
148. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
149. Id. at 611 (quoting Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963)).
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reversal. 150 However, even a test including a focus on the intent to
undermine the defendant's interest in freedom from successive
prosecution through means other than mistrial would not address
the particular problem posed by cases of covert governmental
misconduct.
The more broadly focused intent test does not fit a case like
Smith, because a prosecutor who engages in the type of misconduct
involved in Smith does not act with intent to force the defendant
through successive trials.15' The apparent intent of the prosecutor
is to obtain a conviction through violation of the defendant's right
to disclosure of exculpatory evidence and to avoid any further trial
of the case.152 Thus, the improper intent, if any, is directed toward
the defendant's right to a fair trial before the initial fact-finder,
rather than to the defendant's double jeopardy right to be free of
successive prosecutions.153
3. Alternative Intent-Based Tests
A differently focused intent-based test may provide a useful an-
alytical tool to assess complaints of covert misconduct.. This test, to
be of any utility in analyzing such complaints, must focus on the
prosecutor's intent in relation to the misconduct, the fairness of the
defendant's initial trial and the prosecutor's intent to obtain a sec-
ond trial or to risk reversal. A workable standard would bar retrial
if two requirements were met (1) the prosecutor intended to de-
prive the defendant of a fair trial and, (2) the misconduct had that
effect. In Smith, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted this two-
pronged approach, which uses intent to gauge the severity of the
prosecutor's misconduct, distinguishing between routine or negli-
gent error and serious, egregious error. 54
150. See Pool v. Superior Court, 677 P.2d 261, 271-72 (Ariz. 1984) (finding
that Arizona Constitution bars retrial as only means of curing prejudice to defend-
ant when prosecutor's deliberate misconduct results in mistrial); State v. Kennedy,
666 P.2d 1316, 1326 (Or. 1983) (holding that when prosecutor acts improperly,
either intending to cause or with indifference toward possible mistrial, Oregon
Constitution bars retrial to remedy prejudice to defendant).
151.' See Buffington, 687 F. Supp. at 1093 (finding prosecutor, under facts simi-
lar to Smith, was motivated by desire to prejudice defendant and obtain conviction,
not desire to force defendant through successive proceedings).
152. See id.
153. For example, the facts of Smith suggest that the prosecution knowingly
suppressed exculpatory evidence .and should have known that misconduct would
deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 324
(Pa. 1992). The facts do not suggest that the prosecution contemplated a second
trial, even though Smith would have to endure a second trial to obtain a fair reso-
lution of his case. Id. at 323.
154. Id. at 325.
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In Smith, however, the court appeared to adopt a subjective
definition of intent. The Smith court stated that retrial would be
barred when prosecutorial misconduct "is intentionally undertaken
to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair
trial."155 In addition, the court related the test to the subjective
intent-based test of Kennedy, and invoked no language to suggest an
objective approach to intent.1 56 A subjective intent test forces the
court to plumb the prosecutors' mind to assess their subjective state
while engaged in serious acts of misconduct.
By contrast, a test that rests on an objective determination of
intent-finding intent if the prosecutor "knew or should have
known"-offers some advantages. Such a test relieves the trial
court of the burden of assessing the subjective intent of the lawyer
appearing before the court. A trial court applying the "knew or
should have known" test may look to subjective intent, but need
not. This test also invites appellate courts to engage in more mean-
ingful review than does a subjective intent test.157 Appellate review
will not be limited to whether the trial court's fact finding is sup-
ported by substantial evidence. Instead, the appellate courts may
also consider whether objective factors signal that the prosecutor
"should have known" that the misconduct would deprive the de-
fendant of a fair trial. Through this process, the courts should de-
velop defined standards of absolutely unacceptable governmental
conduct.
More importantly, the objective intent test strikes the appropri-
ate double jeopardy balance. Misconduct that the prosecutor
"knew or should have known" would deprive the defendant of a fair
trial is extremely serious. The intentional nature of the govern-
ment misconduct impacts on the double jeopardy analysis. Rever-
sal normally does not foreclose retrial according to the balance
struck by the Supreme Court in Ball.158 However, there is reason to
strike a different balance when intentional conduct by the govern-
ment renders the first trial unfair. The government interest in re-
trial is significantly diminished by the governmental malfeasance,
and such intentional misconduct directly attacks the defendant's
155. Id.
156. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that "the double jeopardy
clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits retrial of a defendant ... when
the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defend-
ant to the point of denial of a fair trial." Id.
157. For a discussion of the standard of appellate review under the subjective
intent test, see supra note 138.
158. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896).
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significant interests in both the first fact-finder 159 and the freedom
from the oppression of successive trials.160 Thus, such conduct so
seriously implicates double jeopardy interests that retrial should be
barred.
The major drawback of an objective intent test is the risk that it
potentially would bar retrial in an unacceptably large number of
cases. While it appears that prosecutors rarely engage in miscon-
duct intending to provoke mistrial motions from the defense, pros-
ecutors more frequently err in ways they know or should know will
deprive the defendant of a fair trial. 161
Any case in which the prosecution knowingly fails to disclose
material exculpatory evidence could arguably satisfy this test. Thus,
an objective intent-based double jeopardy test may add a layer of
evaluation to cases in which the defendant claims a violation due to
non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence. The decisions that define
when non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence is constitutional error
eschew reliance on governmental intent. 162 The Court has held
that failure to disclose exculpatory evidence violates due process if
the evidence is "material." The Court defines "material" in terms of
its likely affect on the outcome of the trial but does not link the
159. For a discussion of the impact of covert prosecutorial misconduct on the
defendant's interest in the first fact-finder, see supra notes 99-101 and accompany-
ing text.
160. For a discussion of the impact of covert prosecutorial misconduct on the
defendant's interest in freedom from the oppression of successive trials, see supra
notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
161. Generally, when a criminal case goes to trial, the prosecutor has some
hope of obtaining a conviction. The prosecutor's natural instinct is to zealously
pursue a guilty verdict. The number of criminal appeals pointing to prosecutorial
improprieties reveals that prosecutorial behavior that undermines the defendant's
rights and risks an unfair trial is a common occurrence in criminal trials. If the
trial ends without a conviction, as it does when a mistrial is declared, the prosecu-
tion must expend limited resources to retry the case. The result is rarely a happy
one for the prosecution. By contrast, the defendant who avoids a conviction
through mistrial gains a second opportunity to demonstrate the weaknesses in the
prosecution's case and to encounter a jury inclined to acquit.
162. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In Brady, the Court held
that the "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id.
Indeed, the defendant can establish a Brady violation if the exculpatory evidence
was in the hands of a governmental agency, even if it was unknown to the prosecu-
tion. Id. at 87-88; see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678-80 (1985)
(clarifying test for constitutional violation, which considers prosecutorial intent
only when claimed violation is prosecutorial use of perjured testimony). But see
Reiss, supra note 51, at 1465 (arguing that standard for assessing due process viola-
tion depends on prosecutorial intent and that this approach may be necessary "be-
cause nonintent-based schemes are either impractical or substantially alter the
shape of the adversary process").
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term to an assessment of governmental bad faith.163 Under the sug-
gested objective intent double jeopardy test, the court would first
evaluate the significance of the exculpatory evidence, and then as-
sess the prosecutor's actual or constructive awareness of the exist-
ence and value of the evidence. Initially, a Brady violation would
not exist unless the undisclosed evidence probably would have af-
fected the outcome of the case. 164 Thus, the determinative factor
for double jeopardy protection becomes whether the prosecutor
"knew" of the undisclosed evidence, and other material facts, such
that the prosecutor should have known that the failure to disclose
the evidence likely would render the trial unfair. 165
The prospect of such broad application of the double jeopardy
test raises the other concern underlying Ball; that the justice system
cannot function if the price of reversal is discharge.' 66 Although
that concern is of questionable constitutional significance, it has re-
ceived the Court's recognition. and is likely to play a role in circum-
scribing double jeopardy protection in cases like Smith.167
Therefore, even though the defendant's interest is greater than the
government's diminished interest after a reversal for egregious gov-
ernmental misconduct, the courts may fear an undesirable impact
on the administration of the justice system. Consequently, the
courts may hesitate to recognize a different rule based on the bal-
ancing of these interests.' 6 Nevertheless, the courts should recog-
nize an impact On double jeopardy interests and bar reprosecution
when the prosecution "knows or should have known" that its mis-
163. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678-82 ("[A] constitutional error occurs, and the con-
viction must be reversed, only if the evidence is material in the sense that its sup-
pression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."). Interestingly, the
Smith court did not evaluate the materiality of the evidence withheld from the
defendant. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1992). The court
merely asserted that the misconduct was "dearly in violation of the rule of Brady v.
Matyland and, if proved, would, at the very least, entitle the appellant to a new trial
.... "Id. at 322 (citation omitted).
164. For a discussion of the definition of a Brady violation, see supra notes
162-63 and accompanying text.
165. For a discussion of the benefits of a test based on an objective standard
of intent, see supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
166. For a discussion of the concerns underlying the Court's decision in Ball,
see supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the concern that
the justice system cannot function if the price of reversal is discharge, see Ponsoldt,
supra note 47, at 90-95.
167. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964) (discussing practical
effect on administration of justice if price of reversal were discharge).
168. Cf Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676-79 (1982). The Court in Ken-
nedy rejected a broad standard of double jeopardy protection in the context of a
mistrial, citing as one ground the fact that "the judge presiding over the first trial
might well be more loath to grant a defendant's motion for mistrial." Id. at 676.
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conduct would deprive the defendant of a fair trial or when the
prosecution actually intended this result.
B. Conduct-Based Tests
Alternatively, the courts could craft a test focusing on the im-
pact of governmental misconduct on the defendant, rather than on
the governmental intent driving that conduct. 69 However, a
double jeopardy bar is justified only in instances of very serious gov-
ernmental misconduct.170 Defining the conduct that would bar
reprosecution is a daunting task. 17'
Consequently, when courts and commentators seek to identify
conduct that will bar retrial, they generally inject an intent require-
ment into the test.172 For example, a conduct-based standard com-
monly suggested is governmental "overreaching." 173 However, on
its face, the term gives little guidance. Courts, therefore, have com-
plained that the term "overreaching" is too vague and fails to give
adequate direction to the courts charged with enforcing double
jeopardy protection. 174 Courts give content to the term by defining
overreaching as misconduct carried out in bad faith or with aware-
ness of its likely impact on the defendant, thereby injecting an ele-
ment of intent. 75 Some courts have defined overreaching to
include grossly negligent misconduct. 176 However, this standard
169. See Reiss, supra note 51, at 1472-76. Professor Reiss proposes a non-in-
tent-based test that uses a "plain error" standard. Id. at 1472-73. This test "would
take into account (1) the magnitude of the misconduct and (2) the availability of
alternative remedies." Id. at 1472. For a discussion of the "plain error" standard,
see infra note 178.
170. See, e.g., United States v. Russel, 41-1 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973) (noting that
extremely outrageous conduct of law enforcement officials justifies double jeop-
ardy bar).
171. For a discussion of conduct-based arguments under the Due Process
Clause, see supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 679 (holding that double jeopardy bars re-
trial where prosecutor engaged in conduct intended to provoke defendant to
move for mistrial); Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 325 (Pa. 1992) (hold-
ing that Double Jeopardy Clause of Pennsylvania Constitution bars retrial where
prosecutor engaged in conduct intended to prejudice defendant and thereby deny
fair trial).
173. United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d 1246, 1255-56 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding
that intentional prosecutorial misconduct constitutes "overreaching" which trig-
gers double jeopardy).
174. See State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1325 (Or. 1986) ("overreaching" too
vague to be workable due to lack of practical standards for its application and
difficulty of proving the intent to cause mistrial).,
175. See Kessler, 530 F.2d at 1255-56 (defining "overreaching" as grossly negli-
gent or intentional conduct).
176. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d 135, 140 (8th Cir. 1977) (con-
cluding that "[if the government's [misconduct was] not intentionally designed to
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would result in permitting the extreme relief of dismissal and dis-
charge in an unacceptably large number of cases.
The basis for recognizing a bar is the balance between the de-
fendant's double jeopardy interests and the government's interest
in retrying the case. When the government's misconduct is inten-
tional, the defendant's interest is increased and the government's
interest is sufficiently diminished, that the defendant's interest ar-
guably outweighs the government's. By contrast, when the govern-
ment's misconduct merely constitutes gross negligence, the
argument that the balance shifts in the defendant's favor is much
weaker. 177
Like the "overreaching" standard, the "plain error" standard
proposed by some commentators actually requires the determina-
tion of governmental mens rea.178 Like the objective intent-based
test, the "plain error" test involves the assessment that "any compe-
tent prosecutor" would know the conduct was error.179 Thus, the
"plain error" test, like the "knew or should have known" test, does
provoke a mistrial request, at a minimum [it] constitute[d] gross negligence" and
represented prosecutorial overreaching that barred retrial); Kessler, 530 F.2d at
1258 (holding that overreaching included grossly negligent misconduct, but bar-
ring retrial on basis of intentional misconduct and not on basis of gross negli-
gence); People v. Reyher, 728 P.2d 333, 336 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming trial
court's ruling that mistrial did not bar retrial because governmental conduct was
neither grossly negligent nor intended to provoke mistrial). See generally Lawrence
J. Baldasare, Comment, The Double Jeopardy Clause and Mistrials Granted on Defend-
ant's Motion: What Kind of Prosecutorial Misconduct Precludes Reprosecution, 18 DuQ. L.
Rxv. 103 (1979) (analyzing difficult problems raised by permitting reprosecution
where mistrial is granted on prosecutorial misconduct grounds). For an interest-
ing discussion of the gross negligence standard, see Commonwealth v. Potter, 386
A.2d 918 (Pa. 1978).
177. For a discussion of how the courts treat gross negligence of the govern-
ment, see supra note 176 and accompanying text.
178. For a discussion of the "plain error" standard, see Ponsoldt, supra note
47, at 94-100; Reiss supra note 51, at 1472-73. The test proposed by Professor Reiss
relies on the trial court's evaluation of whether a mistrial can be avoided and other
means employed to cure the plain error committed by the prosecution. Reiss,
supra note 51, at 1474-75. Professor Reiss assumes that the trial court will have the
opportunity to evaluate fully the double jeopardy implications of the situation
before declaring or refusing a mistrial. See id. at 1475-77. The reported cases seem
to reflect to the contrary that trial courts often do not assess the double jeopardy
implications of their mistrial decisions. As a result, the appellate court ruling on
the defendant's double jeopardy claim has no chance to select an alternate proce-
dural remedy, but must simply determine the consequences of the trial court's
action. Of course, when the double jeopardy claim rests on covert prosecutorial
misconduct, no court has the opportunity to engage in the suggested evaluation
during the first trial. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1992).
179. For a discussion of the application of the "plain error" test, see Reiss,
supra note 51, at 1473.
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not require a finding of subjective intent but relies on an objective
assessment of prosecutorial intent.
III. CONCLUSION
Smith is a special case, but it is not likely to be unique. The
prosecutorial misconduct in the case was so extreme that it called
for a stern judicial response.180 Yet, given its procedural course, the
case does not fit readily within traditional double jeopardy rules.
The misconduct that precipitated the dismissal in Smith was undis-
covered at trial.181 Consequently, the case proceeded to a convic-
tion based on sufficient evidence of guilt.18 2 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's application of double jeopardy principles to a
fully tried case, where the prosecution produced sufficient evi-
dence, pushes that doctrine into uncharted territory.
Nevertheless, although it is unusual, the double jeopardy bar
to further proceedings against Smith is warranted by the harm to
his Double Jeopardy interests. Two double jeopardy interests war-
rant barring retrial: (1) the interest in the first fact-finder and, (2)
the interest in avoiding the burdens of a second trial.' 83 The
prosecutorial misconduct in Smith threatened the defendant's inter-
est in the first fact-finder by covertly undermining the validity of
that fact-finder's verdict.'8 4 In addition, by compromising the fair-
ness of the first trial, the prosecution forced Smith to seek a second
trial in order to obtain a fair trial. Clearly Smith's interest in avoid-
ing the oppression of a second trial was harmed.'8 5 Although the
threat to these double jeopardy interests was less direct and defined
than when a mistrial or failure to produce proof beyond a reason-
able doubt raises a double jeopardy bar, it was still genuine and
serious.
This threat to the defendant's double jeopardy interests must
be balanced against the public interest in full and fair prosecu-
180. Smith, 615 A.2d at 324-25.
181. Id. at 323.
182. Id. at 321.
183. For a discussion of the defendant's interest in the first fact-finder, see
supra notes 80-101 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the defendant's
interest in avoiding the burden of a second trial, see supra notes 103-17 and accom-
panying text.
184. For a discussion of the effect of covert misconduct on the defendant's
interest in the first fact-finder, see supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
185. For a discussion of the effect of covert misconduct on the defendant's
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tion.186 By concealing the misconduct until after trial, the prosecu-
tion subverted the opportunity to evaluate and remedy the
resulting harm during the first trial. Thus, although the public in-
terest in retrial is greater than it is if the prosecution fails to pro-
duce sufficient proof, the weight of that interest is diminished by
the governmental role in creating the problem.
A standard that focuses on the prosecutor's intent will identify
those cases in which the defendant's interest is substantial and out-
weighs the public interest. The subjective intent Smith test-bar-
ring reprosecution when the prosecutor intentionally deprives the
defendant of a fair trial-hones in on the cases in which the assault
on the defendant's protected interests is strongest and the public
interest, correspondingly, is weakest.' 8 7 An objective intent test-
barring reprosecution if the prosecutor "knew or should have
known" that the misconduct was likely to deprive the defendant of a
fair trial-sweeps more broadly.188 Still, it identifies cases in which
the prosecutor has severely threatened the defendant's double
jeopardy interests in a manner that diminishes the weight of the
public interest in retrial. Either test can be clearly articulated and
easily applied. In addition, neither will lead to such broad applica-
tion of double jeopardy principles that the courts will be deterred
from enforcing doublejeopardy protection to vindicate the defend-
ant's interests, even after trial to verdict. The Smith case, while cur-
rently defining the limits of double jeopardy protection, does not
chart a course outside those limits.' 8 9
186. For a discussion of the government's interest in a full and fair prosecu-
tion, see supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
187. For a discussion of the Smith test, see supra notes 154-56 and accompany-
ing text.
188. For a discussion of the objective intent test, see supra notes 157-68 and
accompanying text.
189. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 323-25 (Pa. 1992) (holding
that double jeopardy prohibits retrial when prosecutor acts with intent to deny fair
trial).
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